President Hoover Pleads With Big Business to Hire Again

Learning Objectives

Past the cease of this section, you volition exist able to:

• Explain Herbert Hoover'south responses to the Great Depression and how they reflected his political philosophy
• Identify the local, city, and state efforts to combat the Swell Depression
• Clarify the frustration and acrimony that a majority of Americans directed at Herbert Hoover

President Hoover was unprepared for the telescopic of the low crisis, and his limited response did not begin to help the millions of Americans in need. The steps he took were very much in keeping with his philosophy of limited government, a philosophy that many had shared with him until the upheavals of the Swell Depression made information technology articulate that a more direct government response was required. Merely Hoover was stubborn in his refusal to give "handouts," every bit he saw direct regime aid. He called for a spirit of volunteerism among America'southward businesses, request them to go on workers employed, and he exhorted the American people to tighten their belts and make do in the spirit of "rugged individualism." While Hoover'due south philosophy and his entreatment to the land were very much in keeping with his character, it was not enough to proceed the economic system from plummeting farther into economic chaos.

The steps Hoover did ultimately take were too piffling, too late. He created programs for putting people back to piece of work and helping beleaguered local and state charities with assist. But the programs were pocket-size in scale and highly specific as to who could do good, and they only touched a pocket-size percentage of those in need. As the state of affairs worsened, the public grew increasingly unhappy with Hoover. He left function with one of the lowest approval ratings of any president in history.

THE INITIAL REACTION

In the immediate backwash of Black Tuesday, Hoover sought to reassure Americans that all was well. Reading his words after the fact, it is easy to discover fault. In 1929 he said, "Any lack of confidence in the economic future or the strength of business organisation in the United states is foolish." In 1930, he stated, "The worst is backside us." In 1931, he pledged federal help should he ever witness starvation in the country; but every bit of that engagement, he had yet to see such need in America, despite the very existent evidence that children and the elderly were starving to death. Nevertheless Hoover was neither intentionally bullheaded nor unsympathetic. He simply held fast to a belief system that did not alter as the realities of the Great Depression set in.

Hoover believed strongly in the ethos of American individualism: that hard piece of work brought its own rewards. His life story testified to that belief. Hoover was born into poverty, made his way through college at Stanford University, and eventually made his fortune as an engineer. This experience, too as his extensive travels in People's republic of china and throughout Europe, shaped his key confidence that the very existence of American civilization depended upon the moral fiber of its citizens, as evidenced by their power to overcome all hardships through individual try and resolve. The idea of government handouts to Americans was repellant to him. Whereas Europeans might need assistance, such as his hunger relief work in Kingdom of belgium during and after Globe War I, he believed the American character to be different. In a 1931 radio accost, he said, "The spread of government destroys initiative and thus destroys character."

Too, Hoover was not completely unaware of the potential damage that wild stock speculation might create if left unchecked. As secretary of commerce, Hoover ofttimes warned President Coolidge of the dangers that such speculation engendered. In the weeks before his inauguration, he offered many interviews to newspapers and magazines, urging Americans to curtail their rampant stock investments, and even encouraged the Federal Reserve to raise the discount rate to go far more costly for local banks to lend money to potential speculators. However, fearful of creating a panic, Hoover never issued a stern alarm to discourage Americans from such investments. Neither Hoover, nor any other politician of that day, e'er gave serious thought to outright authorities regulation of the stock market. This was fifty-fifty true in his personal choices, every bit Hoover often lamented poor stock advice he had one time offered to a friend. When the stock nose-dived, Hoover bought the shares from his friend to assuage his guilt, vowing never again to advise anyone on matters of investment.

In keeping with these principles, Hoover's response to the crash focused on two very common American traditions: He asked individuals to tighten their belts and work harder, and he asked the business community to voluntarily help sustain the economy by retaining workers and continuing production. He immediately summoned a conference of leading industrialists to run across in Washington, DC, urging them to maintain their current wages while America rode out this cursory economic panic. The crash, he assured business concern leaders, was non part of a greater downturn; they had zip to worry about. Similar meetings with utility companies and railroad executives elicited promises for billions of dollars in new construction projects, while labor leaders agreed to withhold demands for wage increases and workers continued to labor. Hoover besides persuaded Congress to laissez passer a $160 million tax cutting to bolster American incomes, leading many to conclude that the president was doing all he could to stem the tide of the panic. In April 1930, the New York Times editorial board ended that "No one in his place could have done more."

However, these modest steps were non enough. Past late 1931, when information technology became clear that the economy would not amend on its ain, Hoover recognized the need for some government intervention. He created the President's Emergency Commission for Employment (PECE), later renamed the President's Organization of Unemployment Relief (Cascade). In keeping with Hoover's distaste of what he viewed as handouts, this organization did non provide direct federal relief to people in need. Instead, it assisted country and individual relief agencies, such as the Red Cantankerous, Salvation Army, YMCA, and Community Chest. Hoover also strongly urged people of means to donate funds to help the poor, and he himself gave significant private donations to worthy causes. Only these private efforts could not alleviate the widespread furnishings of poverty.

Congress pushed for a more straight government response to the hardship. In 1930–1931, information technology attempted to pass a $60 meg pecker to provide relief to drought victims past allowing them access to food, fertilizer, and animal feed. Hoover stood fast in his refusal to provide food, resisting any element of directly relief. The terminal bill of $47 million provided for everything except food but did not come shut to adequately addressing the crunch. Again in 1931, Congress proposed the Federal Emergency Relief Bill, which would have provided $375 million to states to help provide food, wearable, and shelter to the homeless. Simply Hoover opposed the bill, stating that information technology ruined the balance of ability between states and the federal government, and in February 1932, information technology was defeated by 14 votes.

However, the president's adamant opposition to directly-relief federal government programs should non exist viewed as one of indifference or uncaring toward the suffering American people. His personal sympathy for those in need was boundless. Hoover was one of just 2 presidents to reject his bacon for the office he held. Throughout the Great Depression, he donated an average of $25,000 annually to diverse relief organizations to assist in their efforts. Furthermore, he helped to raise $500,000 in private funds to support the White House Conference on Child Health and Welfare in 1930. Rather than indifference or heartlessness, Hoover'south steadfast adherence to a philosophy of individualism as the path toward long-term American recovery explained many of his policy decisions. "A voluntary deed," he repeatedly commented, "is infinitely more precious to our national ideal and spirit than a thousand-fold poured from the Treasury."

Every bit conditions worsened, however, Hoover somewhen relaxed his opposition to federal relief and formed the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in 1932, in part because it was an election year and Hoover hoped to keep his office. Although non a form of direct relief to the American people in greatest demand, the RFC was much larger in scope than whatever preceding effort, setting bated $2 billion in taxpayer money to rescue banks, credit unions, and insurance companies. The goal was to boost confidence in the nation's fiscal institutions by ensuring that they were on solid footing. This model was flawed on a number of levels. First, the programme only lent money to banks with sufficient collateral, which meant that almost of the aid went to large banks. In fact, of the starting time $61 1000000 loaned, $41 meg went to just three banks. Minor town and rural banks got nigh zilch. Furthermore, at this time, confidence in financial institutions was non the primary concern of nigh Americans. They needed nutrient and jobs. Many had no coin to put into the banks, no matter how confident they were that the banks were safe.

Hoover's other attempt at federal aid likewise occurred in 1932, when he endorsed a bill by Senator Robert Wagner of New York. This was the Emergency Relief and Construction Deed. This act authorized the RFC to aggrandize beyond loans to financial institutions and allotted $one.5 billion to states to fund local public works projects. This program failed to deliver the kind of help needed, nonetheless, equally Hoover severely limited the types of projects it could fund to those that were ultimately self-paying (such every bit toll bridges and public housing) and those that required skilled workers. While well intended, these programs maintained the status quo, and there was still no direct federal relief to the individuals who and then badly needed it.

PUBLIC REACTION TO HOOVER

Hoover'south steadfast resistance to government help cost him the reelection and has placed him squarely at the forefront of the most unpopular presidents, according to public opinion, in modern American history. His proper name became synonymous with the poverty of the era: "Hoovervilles" became the common name for homeless shantytowns and "Hoover blankets" for the newspapers that the homeless used to keep warm. A "Hoover flag" was a pants pocket—empty of all money—turned inside out. Past the 1932 election, hitchhikers held up signs reading: "If yous don't requite me a ride, I'll vote for Hoover." Americans did not necessarily believe that Hoover caused the Keen Depression. Their acrimony stemmed instead from what appeared to be a willful refusal to assist regular citizens with direct help that might allow them to recover from the crisis.

Hoover became one of the least pop presidents in history. "Hoovervilles," or shantytowns, were a negative reminder of his part in the nation'southward financial crisis. This family (a) lived in a "Hooverville" in Elm Grove, Oklahoma. This shanty (b) was one of many making up a "Hooverville" in the Portland, Oregon surface area. (credit: modification of work by U.s.a. Farm Security Assistants)

FRUSTRATION AND Protestation: A BAD SITUATION GROWS WORSE FOR HOOVER

Desperation and frustration often create emotional responses, and the Great Depression was no exception. Throughout 1931–1932, companies trying to stay afloat sharply cutting worker wages, and, in response, workers protested in increasingly bitter strikes. As the Depression unfolded, over 80 percent of automotive workers lost their jobs. Even the typically prosperous Ford Motor Visitor laid off 2-thirds of its workforce.

In 1932, a major strike at the Ford Motor Company manufacturing plant virtually Detroit resulted in over sixty injuries and four deaths. Often referred to equally the Ford Hunger March, the event unfolded as a planned demonstration amid unemployed Ford workers who, to protest their desperate situation, marched nine miles from Detroit to the visitor's River Rouge institute in Dearborn. At the Dearborn city limits, local constabulary launched tear gas at the roughly three thousand protestors, who responded by throwing stones and clods of dirt. When they finally reached the gates of the constitute, protestors faced more police and firemen, as well as individual security guards. As the firemen turned hoses onto the protestors, the police and security guards opened fire. In improver to those killed and injured, police force arrested l protestors. One calendar week later, lx thousand mourners attended the public funerals of the iv victims of what many protesters labeled police brutality. The result set the tone for worsening labor relations in the U.S.

Farmers also organized and protested, oft violently. The most notable case was the Subcontract Holiday Association. Led by Milo Reno, this organization held significant sway among farmers in Iowa, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and the Dakotas. Although they never comprised a bulk of farmers in any of these states, their public deportment drew printing attending nationwide. Amongst their demands, the association sought a federal regime programme to ready agricultural prices artificially loftier enough to cover the farmers' costs, as well as a government commitment to sell whatever farm surpluses on the world market. To reach their goals, the group called for farm holidays, during which farmers would neither sell their produce nor buy any other goods until the government met their demands. All the same, the greatest forcefulness of the association came from the unexpected and seldom-planned actions of its members, which included barricading roads into markets, attacking nonmember farmers, and destroying their produce. Some members even raided small town stores, destroying produce on the shelves. Members also engaged in "penny auctions," bidding pennies on foreclosed farm land and threatening whatever potential buyers with bodily harm if they competed in the sale. Once they won the auction, the clan returned the land to the original owner. In Iowa, farmers threatened to hang a local judge if he signed whatever more farm foreclosures. At least one death occurred every bit a direct event of these protests before they waned following the ballot of Franklin Roosevelt.

Ane of the most notable protest movements occurred toward the stop of Hoover's presidency and centered on the Bonus Expeditionary Force, or Bonus Army, in the bound of 1932. In this protest, approximately fifteen thousand World War I veterans marched on Washington to need early payment of their veteran bonuses, which were not due to be paid until 1945. The group camped out in vacant federal buildings and prepare camps in Anacostia Flats nearly the Capitol building.

In the jump of 1932, World War I veterans marched on Washington and gear up camps in Anacostia Flats, remaining there for weeks. (credit: Library of Congress)

Many veterans remained in the city in protest for virtually ii months, although the U.South. Senate officially rejected their asking in July. By the centre of that calendar month, Hoover wanted them gone. He ordered the police force to empty the buildings and clear out the camps, and in the exchange that followed, constabulary fired into the crowd, killing two veterans. Fearing an armed insurgence, Hoover and so ordered General Douglas MacArthur, forth with his aides, Dwight Eisenhower and George Patton, to forcibly remove the veterans from Anacostia Flats. The ensuing raid proved catastrophic, as the war machine burned down the shantytown and injured dozens of people, including a twelve-week-old baby who was killed when accidentally struck past a tear gas canister.

When the U.South. Senate denied early payment of their veteran bonuses, and Hoover ordered their makeshift camps cleared, the Bonus Army protest turned violent, cementing Hoover'southward demise every bit a president. (credit: U.S. Department of Defense)

As Americans bore witness to photographs and newsreels of the U.Southward. Army forcibly removing veterans, Hoover's popularity plummeted fifty-fifty further. By the summer of 1932, he was largely a defeated man. His cynicism and failure mirrored that of the nation'due south citizens. America was a state in desperate need: in demand of a charismatic leader to restore public conviction too equally provide concrete solutions to pull the economy out of the Great Depression.

Whether he truly believed information technology or simply thought the American people wanted to hear information technology, Hoover continued to land publicly that the country was getting dorsum on track. Listen as he speaks near the "Success of Recovery" at a campaign terminate in Detroit, Michigan on Oct 22, 1932.

Section Summary

President Hoover's securely held philosophy of American individualism, which he maintained despite extraordinary economic circumstances, made him particularly unsuited to deal with the crisis of the Great Depression. He greatly resisted authorities intervention, considering it a path to the downfall of American greatness. His initial response of asking Americans to find their ain paths to recovery and seeking voluntary concern measures to stimulate the economy could not stem the tide of the Depression. Ultimately, Hoover did create some federal relief programs, such as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which sought to heave public confidence in fiscal institutions by ensuring that they were on solid footing. When this measure out did little to help impoverished individuals, he signed the Emergency Relief Act, which allowed the RFC to invest in local public works projects. But fifty-fifty this was also picayune, too late. The severe limits on the types of projects funded and type of workers used meant that well-nigh Americans saw no benefit.

The American public ultimately responded with acrimony and protest to Hoover'southward apparent disability to create solutions. Protests ranged from manufactory strikes to subcontract riots, culminating in the notorious Bonus Regular army protestation in the leap of 1932. Veterans from World War I lobbied to receive their bonuses immediately, rather than waiting until 1945. The government denied them, and in the ensuing chaos, Hoover chosen in the military to disrupt the protestation. The violence of this act was the final blow for Hoover, whose popularity was already at an all-time depression.

Review Question

1. What attempts did Hoover make to offer federal relief? How would you evaluate the success or failure of these programs?

Answer to Review Question

1. Hoover formed the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in 1932. This represented a significant effort, although it did not provide whatsoever direct aid to needy Americans. The RFC prepare aside $2 billion in taxpayer money to rescue banks, credit unions, and insurance companies, hoping to promote Americans' confidence in financial institutions. However, by lending coin only to banks with sufficient collateral, he ensured that near of the recipients of the assistance were large banks. Additionally, most Americans at this fourth dimension did not have assets to place into banks, however confident they may have felt. In 1932, Hoover also endorsed the Emergency Relief and Construction Act, which allotted $1.5 billion to states to fund local public works projects. Hoover'south limitations upon the types of projects that could receive funding and the types of workers who could participate, however, express the program'south utility.

Glossary

American individualismthe belief, strongly held by Herbert Hoover and others, that hard work and private effort, absent government interference, comprised the formula for success in the U.Southward.

Bonus Armya group of World War I veterans and affiliated groups who marched to Washington in 1932 to demand their state of war bonuses early on, only to be refused and forcibly removed by the U.S. Army

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